Yesterday I read from I.viii–xi, finishing Part I.
The u.m. makes critical to man his “desires,” “will,” and “wantings.” Without these, he is just a “sprig in an organ barrel.”
You see: reason, gentlemen, is a fine thing, that is unquestionable, but reason is only reason and satisfies only man’s reasoning capacity, while wanting is a manifestation of the whole of life—that is, the whole of human life, including reason and various little itches.
Man wants what is not best for himself if only to rebel against the obligations of lifeless reason—the calendar of human behavior.
I think this is where the u.m. cannot be identified with D. Given what D. has said about individuality, I believe this individualism and the rebellion described—the significance of “wanting” to personality—is the mark of reason’s progeny. D. is pointing to something else. We see this pointed to most explicitly in I.xi, para 1.
The u.m. goes on to say that a man “will deliberately go mad for the occasion, so as to do without reason and still have his own way!”